

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 INR-07  
OES-07 NSC-05 CIAE-00 DLOS-09 /080 W  
-----271354Z 078789 /50 S

R 271042Z MAY 77  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8168  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USLO PEKING  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 7901

USUN FOR LOSDEL

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, EFIS, JA, UR  
SUBJECT: JAPAN-SOVIET FISHERIES AGREEMENT: TOKYO REACTIONS

REF: A) TOKYO 5941; B) MOSCOW 6781

SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH MORE HARD BARGAINING WILL BE NEEDED TO  
ARRIVE AT QUOTAS FOR JAPANESE CATCH IN SOVIET 200-MILE  
FISHERIES ZONE AND AT CONDITIONS FOR SOVIET ACCESS TO JAPAN'S  
OWN NEWLY-ESTABLISHED 200-MILE ZONE, JAPANESE SENSE THAT  
WORST IS OVER AND ARE RUMINATING ON NATURE OF BILATERAL RELA-

TIONSHIP, ON VIABILITY OF JAPANESE CLAIM TO DISPUTED  
ISLANDS, AND EFFICACY OF GOJ'S NEGOTIATING TACTICS VIS-A-VIS  
SOVIETS. THEY BELIEVE RECENT EXPERIENCE HAS  
DEMONSTRATED TO SOVIETS DEPTH OF PUBLIC CONCERN THAT  
DE JUR CLAIM TO "NORTHERN TERRITORIES" NOT BE IMPAIRED.  
THEY SEE UNPRECEDENTED MULTIPARTISAN BACKING FOR GOJ IN  
NEGOTIATIONS AS PRECLUDING EARLY RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN  
LEFTIST PARTIES AND CPSU AND AS POSSIBLY PRESAGING ALL-  
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PARTY LINEUP ON FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS OF  
SIMILAR GRAVITY LIKE NUCLEAR REPROCESSING. MANY HERE  
BELIEVE SOVIETS WERE STRINGING OUT NEGOTIATIONS AS  
REVENGE FOR GOJ HANDLING OF MIG-25 INCIDENT. ARGUING  
THAT SOVIET CONCESSIONS WERE WON ONLY WHEN IT BECAME  
EVIDENT THAT JAPAN WILLING TO FOREGO AGREEMENT RATHER  
THAN PREJUDICE TERRITORIAL CLAIM, MEDIA HAS JUDGED

THAT FOREIGN OFFICE WAS LACKING IN TOUGHNESS AND FORE-SIGHT. SOME OBSERVERS CHALLENGE GOJ ASSERTIONS THAT JAPANESE CLAIM TO NORTHERN ISLANDS UNIMPAIRED BY NEW AGREEMENT, AND THIS QUESTION IS EXPECTED TO BECOME FOCAL POINT OF DIET DEBATE ON AGREEMENT'S RATIFICATION. CHINESE STOCK HAS RISEN AS SOVIETS' HAS DECLINED, AND FOR TIME BEING DOMESTIC CLIMATE IS QUITE FAVORABLE TO CONCLUSION OF LONG-PENDING PEACE TREATY WITH PEKING. WHETHER CHINESE AND GOJ WILLING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION IS ANOTHER MATTER. END SUMMARY

1. JAPAN-SOVIET INTERIM FISHERIES AGREEMENT WAS, AT LONG LAST, INITIALLED IN MOSCOW MAY 25, AND JAPANESE BOATS DEPARTED HOKKAIDO FOR SALMON GROUNDS OUTSIDE SOVIET 200-MILE ZONE SAME NIGHT. JAPANESE FISHING INSIDE SOVIET ZONE, HOWEVER, MUST AWAIT BILATERAL SETTING OF QUOTAS FOR VARIOUS SPECIES AND UMBRELLA AGREEMENT'S RATIFICATION BY DIET (CIRCA JUNE 10). GOJ EXPECTATION THAT SOVIETS WOULD BE HARDLY MORE ACCOMMODATING ON QUOTAS THAN THEY WERE ON TERMS OF INTERIM UMBRELLA AGREEMENT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BORNE OUT BY USSR'S INITIAL OFFER, TABLED IN MOSCOW MAY 25. MEDIA HAVE QUOTED "INFORMED SOURCES" HER TO EFFECT THAT GOJ WOULD DO WELL TO WIN SIXTY PERCENT OF 1975 CATCH PLUS SOVIET UNDERSTANDING THAT QUOTAS WILL DECREASE ONLY GRADUALLY IN SUCCEEDING YEARS.

2. USSR AND JAPAN WILL ALSO TRY TO AGREE NEXT MONTH ON SOVIET-JAPAN FISHERIES AGREEMENT GOVERNING SOVIET ACCESS TO JAPANESE 200-MILE SEA, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE ENFORCED FROM CONFIDENTIAL

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JULY 1. IN NEGOTIATING THIS PACT, JAPANESE WILL AIM TO REINFORCE THEIR CLAIM TO DISPUTED NORTHERN ISLANDS BY INCORPORATION OF REFERENCE TO JAPANESE LEGISLATION, JUST AS SOVIETS DID IN JAPAN-SOVIET AGREEMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, INSOFAR AS TERRITORY IS CONCERNED, GOJ WANTS MIRROR-IMAGE AGREEMENTS. IN PRELIMINARY SPARRING ON TERMS OF SOVIET-JAPAN PACT, SOVIETS SEEM TO HAVE WON ASSURANCES THAT ALTHOUGH SOVIET BOATS WILL BE EXCLUDED FROM JAPANESE 12-MILE TERRITORIAL WATERS, THEIR "TRADITIONAL RECORDS" IN FISHING OFF JAPAN WILL BE RESPECTED. IMPLICATION IS THAT PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN SOVIET QUOTAS MIGHT BE LESS THAN THAT REQUIRED OF JAPANESE IN SOVIET ZONE.

3. ASSUMING THESE AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED, GOJ AND SOVIETS WILL SEEK FURTHER TO NEGOTIATE BY END OF YEAR LONG-TERM AGREEMENTS GOVERNING RECIPROCAL ACCESS TO FISHERIES ZONES. IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED HERE THAT LONG-TERM PACTS WILL BE CLOSELY MODELLED ON INTERIM AGREEMENTS.

4. DRAMATIC FINISH LAST WEEK TO PROTRACTED BARGAINING OVER JAPAN-SOVIET AGREEMENT HAS PROMPTED MUCH RUMINATION HERE OVER BILATERAL RELATIONS GENERALLY AND OVER CONTINUED VIABILITY OF JAPANESE CLAIM TO "NORTHERN TERRITORIES" AND TWO NATIONS' NEGOTIATING TACTICS SPECIFICALLY. FOLLOWING IS DISTILLATION OF RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS, MEDIA COMMENTARY AND OUR TALKS WITH FOREIGN OFFICE MANAGERS OF RUSSIAN TIE.

5. THERE WAS VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS POPULAR BACKING OF

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 7901

USUN FOR LOSDEL

GOJ STANCE ON "NORTHERN TERRITORIES" ISSUE. EVEN HOKKAIDO FISHERMEN, WHO HAD MUCH TO LOSE, STOOD STAUNCHLY BEHIND GOJ. ALL OPPOSITION PARTIES, WITHOUT VISIBLE HESITATION, DEMANDED GOJ STAND FIRM. SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT TERRITORIAL DISPUTE IS "ARTIFICIAL ISSUE" NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT JAPANESE PEOPLE REMAIN STAUNCHLY OPPOSED TO ANY CONCESSIONS THAT WOULD DIM HOPES FOR ISLANDS' EVENTUAL REVERSION TO JAPAN.

6. MULTIPARTISAN BACKING FOR GOJ WAS UNPRECEDENTED. SOCIALISTS AND COMMUNISTS (WITH UPPER HOUSE ELECTION APPROACHING) HAVE COMPETED TO SHOW WHICH PARTY WAS MORE HARD-NOSED VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS. STANCES LEFTIST PARTIES TOOK SEEM TO PRECLUDE ANY

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CPSU IN SHORT-TERM. POSSIBILITY IS NOW PERCEIVED THAT DESPITE LONG JAPANESE HISTORY OF PARTISAN CLEAVAGE OF FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS SIMILAR MULTIPARTISAN CONSENSUS COULD BE REACHED ON OTHER ISSUES OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, SUCH AS NUCLEAR REPROCESSING.

7. LONG AFTER DETAILS OF PROTRACTED NEGOTIATION ARE FORGOTTEN, JAPANESE BITTERNESS OVER SOVIET BULLYING AND "INCONSISTENCY" CONFIDENTIAL

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WILL LINGER. JAPANESE IMPRESSION THAT BOORISHNESS IS BASIC ELEMENT OF SOVIET CHARACTER WAS ABUNDANTLY RECONFIRMED. MEDIA COMMENTATORS WERE NEARLY UNANIMOUS IN HINDSIGHT JUDGMENT THAT SOVIET STRATEGY WAS TO SPIN OUT TALKS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, SHORT OF RUPTURE, THOUGH OPINIONS HAVE DIFFERED AS TO WHETHER PRIMARY SOVIET GOAL WAS (1) TO COMPEL JAPANESE CAPITULATION ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE, OR (2) SIMPLY TO ENSURE THAT WHATEVER AGREEMENT REACHED, JAPANESE CATCH THIS YEAR WOULD BE SHARPLY REDUCED.

8. CONSENSUS ALSO SEEMS TO BE BUILDING HERE THAT FINAL SETTLEMENT WAS DUE TO SOVIET JUDGMENT THAT USSR COULD NOT AFFORD OPEN BREAK WITH JAPAN, IN VIEW OF BILATERAL TRADE RELATIONSHIP AND OF CHINESE INTEREST IN FORGING ANTI-SOVIET ENTENTE. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR TO MOSCOW THAT PUBLIC BACKING HERE FOR GOJ POSITION WAS SUCH THAT JAPANESE WOULD FOREGO AGREEMENT RATHER THAN YIELD CLAIM TO DISPUTED ISLANDS, COMMENTATORS SAY, SOVIETS FINALLY MOVED TOWARD SETTLEMENT. LESSON JAPANESE COMMENTATORS ARE DRAWING FROM THIS IS THAT SOFT WORDS AND FLEXIBLE POSTURE ARE OF NO AVAIL WITH MOSCOW; FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN ROUNDLY CRITICIZED FOR FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH TERRITORIAL DISPUTE AS CENTRAL ISSUE.

9. DESPITE, OR IN RESPONSE TO, VIGOROUS ASSERTIONS BY GOJ LEADERS THAT JAPANESE POSITION ON "NORTHERN TERRITORIES" UNDAMAGED, SOME COMMENTATORS (INCLUDING ASAHI IN EDITORIAL MAY 21) CLAIM TO DISCERN MORTAL WOUND IN 11TH HOUR GOJ AGREEMENT TO DELETION OF WORD "OTHER" FROM ARTICLE 8 OF JAPAN-SOVIET FISHERIES PACT. THEY PREDICT IT WILL BE FOCUS OF DIET DEBATE WHEN PACT IS SUBMITTED FOR RATIFICATION. (ARTICLE 1 LIMITS PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT TO SETTING PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS FOR JAPANESE FISHING IN SOVIET ZONE. ARTICLE 8 AS FINALLY AGREED UNDERLINES LIMITED NATURE OF PACT BY STIPULATING THAT NO PROVISION OF AGREEMENT WOULD PREJUDICE POSITIONS OF EITHER GOVERNMENT ON LOSC ISSUES "AND ALSO ON VARIOUS PROBLEMS CONCERNING MUTUAL RELATIONS." GOJ INSISTS THAT DELETION OF "OTHER" BETWEEN CONFIDENTIAL

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"VARIOUS" AND "PROBLEMS" IN NO WAY OBSCURES SENSE OF THIS CLAUSE, NAMELY THAT FISHERIES AGREEMENT DOES NOT PREJUDICE DE JURE JAPANESE CLAIM TO DISPUTED ISLANDS.) IN ORDER TO MAKE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT JAPANESE POSITION UNALTERED, PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA TOLD PRESS MAY 21 HE WOULD SEND FONMIN TO MOSCOW IN SECOND HALF OF YEAR TO RENEW NEGOTIATIONS ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE.

10. OBSERVERS HERE TEND TO BELIEVE JAPANESE HANDLING OF MIG-25 INCIDENT LAST AUTUMN WAS SIGNIFICANT STIMULUS TO SOVIET TOUGHNESS. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS DID NOT REFER TO INCIDENT IN NEGOTIATING SESSIONS, IT WAS FREQUENTLY ALLUDED TO IN "POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS" DURING COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS. CERTAINLY USSR MUST CALCULATE THAT JAPAN WILL THINK LONG AND HARD SHOULD ANOTHER BELENKO FLY THEIR WAY.

11. JAPANESE COMMENTATORS OCCASIONALLY SUGGEST THAT US INDIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR DIFFICULTIES WITH USSR. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THIS VIEW TURN ON NOTIONS THAT (1) US DECLARATION OF 200-MILE ZONE LEFT FISH-SHORT SOVIETS NO OPTION BUT TO FOLLOW SUIT; AND (2) EXPLOITATION OF MIGH AND REFUSAL TO RETURN BELENKO WAS RESULT OF US PRESSURE. DOMINANT PERCEPTIONS HERE, HOWEVER, SEEM TO BE THAT (1) GOJ MANAGEMENT OF MIG INCIDENT ACCORDED WITH COMMON SENSE; (2) 200-MILE ZONES WERE INEVITABLE SOONER OR LATER; AND (3) US WAS FAR MORE ACCOMMODATING THAN RUSSIANS TO JAPANESE NEED FOR ACCESS TO 200-MILE ZONE.

12. RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH RUSSIANS HAS PERSUADED MANY HERE THAT CHINESE HAVE BEEN RIGHT ABOUT SOVIET "HEGEMONISM." SOCIALIST PARTY CHAIRMAN NARITA ON MAY 21 ANNIVERSARY POINTEDLY REMINDED NATION THAT HE, AT LEAST, HAD JOINED CHINESE IN CON-DEMNING SOVIET HEGEMONISM TWO YEARS PREVIOUSLY. WE SENSE THAT INTRA-LDP OPPOSITION TO LONG-PENDING PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH PRC HAS MARKEDLY SUBSIDED, AND BELIEVE THAT FOR TIME BEING, SHOULD FUKUDA SEEK TO CONCLUDE PFT, CONSENSUS IS ATTAINABLE HERE IF CHINESE WERE TO PROVE MINIMALLY RESPONSIVE  
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REGARDING OUTSTANDING POINTS OF DISPUTE. HOWEVER, GOJ BUREAUCRACY (AND FUKUDA HIMSELF) SEEM INTENT ON DEFLECTING ANY PRECIPITATE MOVE TOWARD PRC THAT MIGHT PROVE UNNECESSARILY PROVOCATIVE TO SOVIETS.  
SHOESMITH

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## Message Attributes

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